“…my feeling is that trans* women are trans* women. I think if you’ve lived in a world as a man with the privileges that the world accords to men and then…change, switch gender it’s difficult for me to accept that then we can equate your experience with the experience of a woman who has lived from the beginning in the world as a woman and who has not been accorded those privileges that men are. I don’t think it’s a good thing to conflate everything into one, I don’t think it’s a good thing to talk about women’s issues being exactly the same as the issues of trans* women. What I’m saying is that gender is not biology, gender is sociology.”[i]
These words, spoken by Nigerian writer and feminist Chimamanda Ngozi
Adichie in a short interview with Channel 4 News have been the source of much
contention and fallout over the past few days.[ii]
Since its posting earlier this week, the video has faced outpourings of
backlash from LGBT+ activists, whether they themselves are trans* or advocating
on behalf of trans* people.
The charge is one of trans* exclusion. As one may expect, this has
led to claims that Chimamanda is a trans-exclusionary radical feminist (TERF),
a claim which not only fixes her within a particular feminist tradition
(rightly or wrongly) and which further employs the acronym as a pejorative. The
attack is a simple one. It is an accusation that she is wrong (or perhaps
incorrect, if this distinction is to figure anywhere here). This has been
accompanied with a plethora of comments which (in same breath as declaring her
a TERF) deny her the status of feminist and denounce her ‘ignorance’. According
to commenters, she’s woefully misguided, denying ‘facts’,[iii]
ignoring the basic reality of trans* people and is, at once, just plainly
unaware of the ‘established discourse’. It is unclear as to what discourse this
could be.[iv]
Perhaps more interesting are those who accuse her of ‘speaking for’ trans*
people, where this ‘speaking for’ seems to be an act of ventriloquism, of
wrongly inhabiting their space and experiences.
I am not concerned with Adichie’s status as a feminist – in as far
as it is an identity label – nor am I particularly concerned with whether or
not her views mesh with whatever is perceived as the established discourse.
Indeed, this would prompt further questions as to whose discourse this is,
where it is enacted (and by whom), and to what end it is employed. Furthermore,
it endorses the term ‘feminist’ as an identity status, transforming it from an
adjective, a descriptor, to a noun in the form of “I am a feminist”.[v]
Instead, my interest is, firstly, the question of trans* exclusion. Does
Adichie exclude trans* women from the category of woman? If so upon what
grounds? Secondly, I consider the other side of this situation, in which the
accusation is one of accusing trans* women of possessing “male privilege”. What
exactly this means to say is a question of socialisation, of attitudes towards
individuals in terms of how they are recognised in relation to others. It is of
central importance to the feminist project as a whole (however one might seek
to formulate it) that these concepts are elucidated. For without them, the
grounds upon which one wishes to discuss the oppression of both women and female-bodied
persons (both in as far as these coincide and split apart), is torn away and
the very notion of patriarchy goes with it.
Reading the words Adichie used, it is clear to see why they have
been read in this way. Trans* women are spoken of in conjunction and, given the
context, opposition with “women”. The structure here is othering, pitting one
against the other. One should not rush to condemn those who find issue with
this phrasing, there is clearly a tension within the words used. But does this
amount to trans* exclusion? Well, as Adichie explained in a clarificatory
Facebook post three days after the interview:
“Perhaps I should have said trans women are trans women and cis women are cis women and all are women. Except that 'cis' is not an organic part of my vocabulary. And would probably not be understood by a majority of people. Because saying ‘trans’ and ‘cis’ acknowledges that there is a distinction between women born female and women who transition, without elevating one or the other, which was my point.”[vi]
Within this clarification, Adichie seeks to right misinterpretations
of both her meaning and her intentions. At other points within this post, she
further establishes not only her personal discomfort with being seen to hold
this view, but also with the view itself.[vii]
We must of course remember the context of her original comments. They are given
to us in a recorded interview (under six minutes in total length), and are not
formulated within words which can be edited and revised. Furthermore, the
interviewing body is that of Channel 4 News, a national channel. Whether for
the sake of inclusivity or not, Adichie makes clear that in this context, the
term cis – a term which, by means of its introduction, I think beautifully
clears up the charge of trans* exclusion – is likely not to have been
understood. The very term cis is part of one particular gender vocabulary
which, whilst popular, is far from universally understood – particularly by the
general public, with all its subdivisions.
If then, to paraphrase, Adichie is saying that trans* women are trans*
women, cis* women are cis* women and both trans* women and cis* women are
women, as I think she does, the charge of trans* exclusion becomes more
difficult to maintain. All she seems to be maintaining is, as she makes quite
clear in her original comments, that we should not be so quick to conflate the
two identities, to reduce them into an artificial unity. To be sure, it is
strange to me that anyone would wish to challenge this, especially if one
wishes to maintain the accusation of her wrongly ‘speaking for’ trans* people.
For if trans* women and cis* women are the same, reduced to one, then Adichie,
as a cis* woman, is as much a part of the category of trans* woman as a trans*
woman is part of category: cis* women.
This would appear to posit a messy state of affairs and one which
would only serve to silence issues facing one group, or even both.
So much for trans* exclusion. Yet another issue remains. Adichie
makes it clear that, according to her, one of the motivations for separating
cis* and trans* women lies in their differing experiences and within the
privileges that trans* women face as male-bodied people, presumably before
coming out, stating their gender identity or changing their gender
performativity.[viii]
It is the claim that trans* women have at one time possessed ‘male privilege’
that has been seemingly most picked up to support this claim of ‘speaking for.’
Yet is Adichie inhabiting the voice of a trans* person? Is she
speaking on their behalf or disclosing the kinds of experience they may face?
Perhaps in part, but it seems that she is more concerned with speaking about
trans* people, as someone who is not trans* herself. The line between speaking
about someone and ventriloquising them, occupying their voice (perhaps falsely),
is a murky one.
As a staple concept within feminism (beginning of course within the ‘second
wave’ and radical school of feminism) male privilege from its inception has
been articulated by female-bodied people, those often regarded (rightly or
wrongly) as women. Male privilege speaks of reception and of experience, and is
therefore at least in part speaking on behalf of another. The concept enables
us to speak of its lack, it’s converse: formulated originally as female
oppression. It is from then that we are able to make any kind of articulation
of oppression on the grounds of one’s sex, perceived sex, and – through the
developments of queer feminist theory – one’s gender. If it through speaking on
behalf of another that such concepts of privilege can be articulated, then it does
not seem to be that such ventriloquism is to be solely frowned upon. On the
contrary, they are an essential to the very trans-inclusive feminist project.
Of course, this is not to ignore the differences between men and trans*
women (including the obvious difference of men being men and trans* women being
women), particularly in terms of power and position.[ix]
All I wish to note is that speaking of or about (and perhaps even in some sense
for) another should not be regarded as some kind of violation or overstepping
one’s ‘right’. Feminism as a discipline has – as I think I can state somewhat
uncontroversially – been primarily driven and maintained by women (and here I
do explicitly include both cis* and trans* women).[x]
It has made commentary about both the social position of men – and indeed their
experiences – from without, as the nature of the claims do not concern solely
the subjective experiences of men, but their socio-political position. Feminism
has also commented on the position of women, despite many women claiming (both rightly
and wrongly, depending on the case) that feminism misrepresents them. I am
thinking here in particular of those women who regard feminism as an elaborate
form of ‘whining’, and who are often unaware of those nebulous social forces
which shape their experiences. Speaking about and for another, whether one
shares with them or is divided from them by some category of identity or
another, should not be dismissed de facto.
It should be noted that privilege is not so much about identity in
as far as an individual self-identifies, but instead concerns identity in the
mode that the individual is seen. Were it so simply the case that
self-identification afforded an individual all the privileges of the category
with which they identified, then there would be no great disparity between the
treatment of trans* and non-binary people compared to the treatment of cis*
individuals. This is not the case. We could think of this in terms of simply
regarding oneself as human. Historically, those in oppressed categories
(whether based on gender, sex, sexuality, race etc.) have been scornfully
regarded, in various ways, as sub-human and thus not afforded basic human
rights and dignity. This persists even today in spite of the strong sense in which
those so oppressed regard themselves as human. This is to say that the
possession of such privilege is not so much the ‘fault’ or responsibility of
the individual who has the privilege, for the privilege is given (or not given)
often in ways that are outside of the direct control of the individual. Thus,
to say that someone possesses such a privilege should not be conflated with a moral judgement of the one with the
privilege. Of course, I do not mean to ignore the history of using notions such
as male privilege to exclude trans* women from the category of woman, but I do
contend that no such exclusion is occurring here. But the point stands that one
does not need to speak for, or steal the voice of another person, in order to
speak about male privilege. It is something which is articulated from without.
If we are to speak of male privilege and speaking about or for
others, we must speak of socialisation.
From a young age, socialisation takes root. Whilst I uphold the
sex/gender distinction as much as I am able, one must recognise that this
conceptual division does not reflect the ‘common sense’ reality. For many
people outside feminist discourse, sex and gender are interchangeable and this
is reflected in the treatment of children. This is what we could refer to as
the ‘common sense’ attitude. As soon as a child is coded as male or female,
which most commonly occurs shortly after birth, the child inherits a whole
array of gendered meanings. Treatment by others shapes their social position
and certain privileges are afforded to those who are – or at least who are
regarded as – male-bodied. This and this alone is what is entailed within the
claim that trans* women (or at least those who were/are male-bodied) possess/possessed
male privilege. Of course, the situation is in some sense changing, resulting
in a perhaps more accepting world; but we cannot – in our want to change the
world and challenge those elements we find not to sit well with us – ignore the
predominant view, the ‘common sense’ approach. In order to challenge this
approach, we must first understand it and be able to communicate with those who
purport it. Such would be to deny the world to which one wishes to object, to
deny the very problem feminism could be said to arise in opposition to.
Laurie Richards’ objections to this point (in her ThinkProgress
article) have been objectionably phrased in terms not only of “political
dishonesty” (whatever one considers this to mean in this context) but also as
ignorance of “decades of scientific research”.[xi]
The central claim here appears to be that Adichie is simplifying, erasing a
huge amount of emotional turmoil and difficulty (both internal and external)
which trans* women experience, that she is using the basis of their once having
had male privilege to deny their oppression. Not only is this reading of
Adichie’s words somewhat mitigated within her clarification,[xii]
but I, as well as at least two prominent gender theorists,[xiii]
take further issue with the ‘born this way’ narrative with which she presents
trans* experiences (which ironically seems equally if not guiltier of simplistically
collapsing trans* narratives than anything Adichie may have said).[xiv]
This is reminiscent of the very biological essentialism trans* people so often
have to fight against. Furthermore, I consider her understanding of ‘male
privilege’ to be quite narrow. We must remember, male privilege is not so much
about subjective experience, but about one’s treatment by others. And part of
this is to recognise that one may possess privileges, but that these do not
mitigate or invalidate any oppressions which one may face.
But conversely, such oppression furthermore does not erase one’s
privileges, as Richards seems to claim. To think such would be as reductive as
it is claimed Adichie’s comments are. I am thinking here in particular of the
response by trans* icon Laverne Cox, whose essential claim is that her being
perceived as a feminine boy (whether before or after coming out) erased any
male privilege she may have had.[xv]
On Cox’s own terms, it is the way in which one is perceived that shapes one’s
privilege, but even being regarded as a feminine boy is to be regarded as a
boy, as one who is assumed (in this case wrongly) as male. Cox further
criticises Adichie – wrongly, I think – on the grounds of presenting a singularising
narrative for both trans* and cis* identities.[xvi]
Nothing in Adichie’s comments speak to this charge. Instead, she is clear that
we should instead be mindful not to
conflate and reduce things to simple unities. This stands for cis* and trans*
identities as much as it does the overall category of woman.
My main concern here is that to view male privilege so reductively,
is to undermine a central aspect of patriarchy. I’ve spoken somewhat lengthily
here about Richards’ article on ThinkProgress. As a website, ThinkProgress
shares important stories, highlighting key feminist issues. It rightly speaks
about the oppression of female-bodied people and women (again, both is as far
as these two cohere and divide), drawing attention to issues of oppression which
are far more than isolated occurrence, but are caused by the underlying,
patriarchal structure of western cultures. In order to speak of these
structures, to speak of the system as a whole, we must step outside of
ourselves. This is not to say that we leave behind our subjectivity – not that
this would be possible anyway – or that we ignore individual voices, but it
does necessitate a willingness to speak about and for others. If this is
forbidden and viewed exclusively as a transgression, we have reached a
dangerous position, one in which we are robbed of the vocabulary with which
systemic oppression can be articulated.
One cannot help but feel that this controversy passes comment on the
nature of liberal feminist discourse. Whilst overly fixating on the language
Adichie uses to express herself – a language which, it must be noted, she
explicitly declares as not her own[xvii]
– commentators are using an altogether too static notion of discourse. In so
doing, they appear to regard feminism and its questions not as a lively field
of discussion and engagement, the natural fallout of which is disagreement, but
as a foregone conclusion. This is mirrored in those who wish to, on the basis
of perceived trans* exclusion, exclude Adichie from feminism itself. The basic
formulation is that one must believe this or one may not speak of it at all. It
is a dangerous state, one which collapses the richness of diverse discourse. To
be clear, this is not a simplistic call for any kind of freedom of speech, and
I am certainly not saying that all contributions (I have in mind here hate
speech) are to be welcomed equally. Instead, I think it misunderstands the very
dynamism at the core of feminism, indeed at the core of anything we might speak
of as political speech.[xviii]
To close my thoughts, I would like to end as I began, with Adichie’s
own words:
“To acknowledge different experiences is to start to move towards more fluid – and therefore more honest and true to the real world – conceptions of gender.”[xix]
[i]Channel 4 News, Chimamanda
Ngozi Adichie On Feminism, 2017
<https://www.channel4.com/news/chimamanda-ngozi-adichie-on-feminism>
[accessed 15 March 2017].
[ii] I include here only two examples, for the sake of brevity. See: Noah Michaelson,
‘Author Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie Under Fire For Comments About Trans Women’, Huffington
Post, 11 March 2017 <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/chimamanda-ngozi-adichie-transgender-women-feminism_us_58c40324e4b0d1078ca7180b>
[accessed 15 March 2017]. and Laurie Richards,
‘No, Trans Women Do Not Grow up with Male Privilege’, ThinkProgress, 15
March 2017
<https://thinkprogress.org/trans-women-do-not-grow-up-with-male-privilege-e51eba1eb42c#.ctt1q0lhw>
[accessed 15 March 2017].
[iii] Which is of
course to beg the questions of whose facts these are,
in what context they are situated, whence comes their factual status.
[iv] To speak of this in terms of ‘the feminist
discourse’ would not answer this question, but supplant it with another: which
feminist discourse?
[v] There is a sense in which this totalises the status of feminism, collapses its discursive
elements into a doctrine
[vi] Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, ‘CLARIFYING’, 2017
<https://www.facebook.com/chimamandaadichie/photos/a.469824145943.278768.40389960943/10154893542340944/?type=3&theater>
[accessed 15 March 2017].
[viii] Speaking of course as in Butler’s sense, see: Judith Butler, Gender
Trouble (New York: Routledge, 1990).
[ix] Power is, however, complex and the disparities and similarities
across identities and their enactedness and reception is more dense a topic
than I can elucidate here fully.
[x] This is obviously not to ignore the many male/masculine
contributors to such theory, notably (at least for radical feminism) a
reasonably well-known figure: Karl Marx.
[xii] “A trans woman is a person born male and a person who, before
transitioning, was treated as male by the world. Which means that they
experienced the privileges that the world accords men. This does not dismiss
the pain of gender confusion or the difficult complexities of how they felt
living in bodies not their own.” - Adichie.
[xiii] I think in particularly here of Judith Butler’s work on sex and
gender within: Butler. particularly the chapter ‘Foucault, Herculine, and the politics of
sexual discontinuity.’ and Michel Foucault’s work within: Michel Foucault, The
History of Sexuality, trans. by Robert Hurley, 5 vols (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1978), i.
[xiv] Richards
[xv] Laverne Cox, ‘Laverne Cox - Twitter’
<https://twitter.com/Lavernecox?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor>
[accessed 15 March 2017].
[xvi] Ibid.
[xvii] Adichie,
[xviii] My thoughts here are informed by Hannah Arendt’s notion of novelty
as intrinsic to any true political discourse, see: Hannah Arendt, The
Human Condition, 1st edn (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).
Works Cited
Adichie, Chimamanda Ngozi, ‘CLARIFYING’, 2017 <https://www.facebook.com/chimamandaadichie/photos/a.469824145943.278768.40389960943/10154893542340944/?type=3&theater> [accessed 15 March 2017]
Arendt, Hannah, The Human Condition, 2nd edn (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999)
Butler, Judith, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2006)
Channel 4 News, Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie On Feminism, 2017 <https://www.channel4.com/news/chimamanda-ngozi-adichie-on-feminism> [accessed 15 March 2017]
Cox, Laverne, ‘Laverne Cox - Twitter’ <https://twitter.com/Lavernecox?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor> [accessed 15 March 2017]
Foucault, Michel, The History of Sexuality, trans. by Robert Hurley, 5 vols (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), i
Michaelson, Noah, ‘Author Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie Under Fire For Comments About Trans Women’, Huffington Post, 11 March 2017 <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/chimamanda-ngozi-adichie-transgender-women-feminism_us_58c40324e4b0d1078ca7180b> [accessed 15 March 2017]
Richards, Laurie, ‘No, Trans Women Do Not Grow up with Male Privilege’, ThinkProgress, 15 March 2017 <https://thinkprogress.org/trans-women-do-not-grow-up-with-male-privilege-e51eba1eb42c#.ctt1q0lhw> [accessed 15 March 2017]
Works Consulted
Ahmed, Sara, Queer Phenomenology: Orientations,
Objects, Others (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006)
de Beauvoir, Simone, The Second Sex, trans. by
Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany-Chevallier (London: Jonathan Cape, 2009)
Butler, Judith, Bodies That Matter on the
Discursive Limits Of ‘sex’ (Routledge, 2011)
Butler, Judith, Subjects of Desire: Hegelian
Reflections in Twentieth-Century France (United States: Columbia University
Press, 2012)
Irigaray, Luce, To Speak Is Never Neutral (New
York: Routledge, 1997)
Witt, Charlotte, ‘Anti-Essentialism in Feminist
Theory’, Philosophical Topics, 23 (1995), 321–44
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